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Abstract. Deep neural networks are increasingly being used as con-
trollers for safety-critical systems. Because neural networks are opaque,
certifying their correctness is a significant challenge. To address this issue,
several neural network verification approaches have recently been pro-
posed. However, these approaches afford limited scalability, and apply-
ing them to large networks can be challenging. In this paper, we propose
a framework that can enhance neural network verification techniques
by using over-approximation to reduce the size of the network — thus
making it more amenable to verification. We perform the approximation
such that if the property holds for the smaller (abstract) network, it holds
for the original as well. The over-approximation may be too coarse, in
which case the underlying verification tool might return a spurious coun-
terexample. Under such conditions, we perform counterexample-guided
refinement to adjust the approximation, and then repeat the process.
Our approach is orthogonal to, and can be integrated with, many exist-
ing verification techniques. For evaluation purposes, we integrate it with
the recently proposed Marabou framework, and observe a significant im-
provement in Marabou’s performance. Our experiments demonstrate the
great potential of our approach for verifying larger neural networks.
1 Introduction
Machine programming (MP), the automatic generation of software, is showing
early signs of fundamentally transforming the way software is developed [15].
A key ingredient employed by MP is the deep neural network (DNN), which
has emerged as an effective means to semi-autonomously implement many com-
plex software systems. DNNs are artifacts produced by machine learning : a user
provides examples of how a system should behave, and a machine learning algo-
rithm generalizes these examples into a DNN capable of correctly handling inputs
that it had not seen before. Systems with DNN components have obtained un-
precedented results in fields such as image recognition [24], game playing [33],
natural language processing [16], computer networks [28], and many others, of-
ten surpassing the results obtained by similar systems that have been carefully
handcrafted. It seems evident that this trend will increase and intensify, and
that DNN components will be deployed in various safety-critical systems [3,19].
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DNNs are appealing in that (in some cases) they are easier to create than
handcrafted software, while still achieving excellent results. However, their usage
also raises a challenge when it comes to certification. Undesired behavior has
been observed in many state-of-the-art DNNs. For example, in many cases slight
perturbations to correctly handled inputs can cause severe errors [35,26]. Because
many practices for improving the reliability of hand-crafted code have yet to
be successfully applied to DNNs (e.g., code reviews, coding guidelines, etc.), it
remains unclear how to overcome the opacity of DNNs, which may limit our
ability to certify them before they are deployed.
To mitigate this, the formal methods community has begun developing tech-
niques for the formal verification of DNNs (e.g., [10,17,20,37]). These techniques
can automatically prove that a DNN always satisfies a prescribed property. Un-
fortunately, the DNN verification problem is computationally difficult (e.g., NP-
complete, even for simple specifications and networks [20]), and becomes expo-
nentially more difficult as network sizes increase. Thus, despite recent advances
in DNN verification techniques, network sizes remain a severely limiting factor.
In this work, we propose a technique by which the scalability of many ex-
isting verification techniques can be significantly increased. The idea is to apply
the well-established notion of abstraction and refinement [6]: replace a network
N that is to be verified with a much smaller, abstract network, N¯ , and then
verify this N¯ . Because N¯ is smaller it can be verified more efficiently; and it is
constructed in such a way that if it satisfies the specification, the original net-
work N also satisfies it. In the case that N¯ does not satisfy the specification, the
verification procedure provides a counterexample x. This x may be a true coun-
terexample demonstrating that the original network N violates the specification,
or it may be spurious. If x is spurious, the network N¯ is refined to make it more
accurate (and slightly larger), and then the process is repeated. A particularly
useful variant of this approach is to use the spurious x to guide the refinement
process, so that the refinement step rules out x as a counterexample. This vari-
ant, known as counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [6], has
been successfully applied in many verification contexts.
As part of our technique we propose a method for abstracting and refining
neural networks. Our basic abstraction step merges two neurons into one, thus
reducing the overall number of neurons by one. This basic step can be repeated
numerous times, significantly reducing the network size. Conversely, refinement
is performed by splitting a previously merged neuron in two, increasing the
network size but making it more closely resemble the original. A key point is
that not all pairs of neurons can be merged, as this could result in a network
that is smaller but is not an over-approximation of the original. We resolve
this by first transforming the original network into an equivalent network where
each node belongs to one of four classes, determined by its edge weights and its
effect on the network’s output; merging neurons from the same class can then be
done safely. The actual choice of which neurons to merge or split is performed
heuristically. We propose and discuss several possible heuristics.
For evaluation purposes, we implemented our approach as a Python frame-
work that wraps the Marabou verification tool [22]. We then used our framework
to verify properties of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS Xu) set
of benchmarks [20]. Our results strongly demonstrate the potential usefulness of
abstraction in enhancing existing verification schemes: specifically, in most cases
the abstraction-enhanced Marabou significantly outperformed the original. Fur-
ther, in most cases the properties in question could indeed be shown to hold or
not hold for the original DNN by verifying a small, abstract version thereof.
To summarize, our contributions are: (i) we propose a general framework
for over-approximating and refining DNNs; (ii) we propose several heuristics for
abstraction and refinement, to be used within our general framework; and (iii) we
provide an implementation of our technique that integrates with the Marabou
verification tool and use it for evaluation. Our code is available online [9].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a
brief background on neural networks and their verification. In Section 3, we
describe our general framework for abstracting an refining DNNs. In Section 4,
we discuss how to apply these abstraction and refinement steps as part of a
CEGAR procedure, followed by an evaluation in Section 5. In Section 6, we
discuss related work, and we conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Neural Networks
A neural network consists of an input layer, an output layer, and one or more
intermediate layers called hidden layers. Each layer is a collection of nodes,
called neurons. Each neuron is connected to other neurons by one or more di-
rected edges. In a feedforward neural network, the neurons in the first layer
receive input data that sets their initial values. The remaining neurons calculate
their values using the weighted values of the neurons that they are connected to
through edges from the preceding layer (see Fig. 1). The output layer provides
the resulting value of the DNN for a given input.
There are many types of DNNs, which may differ in the way their neu-
ron values are computed. Typically, a neuron is evaluated by first computing
a weighted sum of the preceding layer’s neuron values according to the edge
weights, and then applying an activation function to this weighted sum [13]. We
focus here on the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function [29], given as
ReLU(x) = max (0, x). Thus, if the weighted sum computation yields a positive
value, it is kept; and otherwise, it is replaced by zero.
More formally, given a DNN N , we use n to denote the number of layers
of N . We denote the number of nodes of layer i by si. Layers 1 and n are the
input and output layers, respectively. Layers 2, . . . , n− 1 are the hidden layers.
We denote the value of the j-th node of layer i by vi,j , and denote the column
vector [vi,1, . . . , vi,si ]
T as Vi.
Evaluating N is performed by calculating Vn for a given input assignment
V1. This is done by sequentially computing Vi for i = 2, 3, . . . , n, each time using
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Fig. 1. A fully connected, feedforward DNN with 5 input nodes (in orange), 5 output
nodes (in purple), and 4 hidden layers containing a total of 36 hidden nodes (in blue).
Each edge is associated with a weight value (not depicted).
the values of Vi−1 to compute weighted sums, and then applying the ReLU
activation functions. Specifically, layer i (for i > 1) is associated with a weight
matrix Wi of size si × si−1 and a bias vector Bi of size si. If i is a hidden layer,
its values are given by Vi = ReLU(WiVi−1 + Bi), where the ReLUs are applied
element-wise; and the output layer is given by Vn = WnVn−1 + Bn (ReLUs are
not applied). Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper we assume that
all bias values are 0, and can be ignored. This rule is applied repeatedly once for
each layer, until Vn is eventually computed.
We will sometimes use the notation w(vi,j , vi+1,k) to refer to the entry of
Wi+1 that represents the weight of the edge between neuron j of layer i and
neuron k of layer i + 1. We will also refer to such an edge as an outgoing edge
for vi,j , and as an incoming edge for vi+1,k.
As part of our abstraction framework, we will sometimes need to consider a
suffix of a DNN, in which the first layers of the DNN are omitted. For 1 < i < n,
we use N [i] to denote the DNN comprised of layers i, i+ 1, . . . , n of the original
network. The sizes and weights of the remaining layers are unchanged, and layer
i of N is treated as the input layer of N [i].
Fig. 2 depicts a small neural network. The network has n = 3 layers, of sizes
s1 = 1, s2 = 2 and s3 = 1. Its weights are w(v1,1, v2,1) = 1, w(v1,1, v2,2) = −1,
w(v2,1, v3,1) = 1 and w(v2,2, v3,1) = 2. For input v1,1 = 3, node v2,1 evaluates to
3 and node v2,2 evaluates to 0, due to the ReLU activation function. The output
node v3,1 then evaluates to 3.
2.2 Neural Network Verification
DNN verification amounts to answering the following question: given a DNN N ,
which maps input vector x to output vector y, and predicates P and Q, does
there exist an input x0 such that P (x0) and Q(N(x0)) both hold? In other words,
the verification process determines whether there exists a particular input that
meets the input criterion P , and that is mapped to an output that meets the
v1,1
v2,1
v2,2
v3,1
1
-1
1
2
Hidden
layer
Input
layer
Output
layer
Fig. 2. A simple feedforward neural network.
output criterion Q. We refer to 〈N,P,Q〉 as the verification query. As is usual
in verification, Q represents the negation of the desired property. Thus, if the
query is unsatisfiable (UNSAT), the property holds; and if it is satisfiable (SAT),
then x0 constitutes a counterexample to the property in question.
Different verification approaches may differ in (i) the kinds of neural net-
works they allow (specifically, the kinds of activation functions in use); (ii) the
kinds of input properties; and (iii) the kinds of output properties. For simplicity,
we focus on networks that employ the ReLU activation function. In addition, our
input properties will be conjunctions of linear constraints on the input values.
Finally, we will assume that our networks have a single output node y, and that
the output property is y > c for a given constant c. We stress that these restric-
tions are for the sake of simplicity. Many properties of interest, including those
with arbitrary Boolean structure and involving multiple neurons, can be reduced
into the above single-output setting by adding a few neurons that encode the
Boolean structure [20,32]; see Fig. 3 for an example. The number of neurons
to be added is typically negligible when compared to the size of the DNN. In
particular, this is true for the ACAS Xu family of benchmarks [20], and also
for adversarial robustness queries that use the L∞ or the L1 norm as a distance
metric [5,14,21]. Additionally, other piecewise-linear activation functions, such
as max-pooling layers, can also be encoded using ReLUs [5].
Several techniques have been proposed for solving the aforementioned veri-
fication problem in recent years (Section 6 includes a brief overview). Our ab-
straction technique is designed to be compatible with most of these techniques,
by simplifying the network being verified, as we describe next.
3 Network Abstraction and Refinement
Because the complexity of verifying a neural network is strongly connected to
its size [20], our goal is to transform a verification query ϕ1 = 〈N,P,Q〉 into
query ϕ2 = 〈N¯ , P,Q〉, such that the abstract network N¯ is significantly smaller
than N (notice that properties P and Q remain unchanged). We will construct
N¯ so that it is an over-approximation of N , meaning that if ϕ2 is UNSAT then
ϕ1 is also UNSAT. More specifically, since our DNNs have a single output, we can
regard N(x) and N¯(x) as real values for every input x. To guarantee that ϕ2
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Fig. 3. Reducing a complex property to the y > 0 form. For the network on the left
hand side, suppose we wish to examine the property y2 > y1 ∨ y2 > y3, which is a
property that involves multiple outputs and includes a disjunction. We do this (right
hand side network) by adding two neurons, t1 and t2, such that t1 = ReLU(y2 − y1)
and t2 = ReLU(y2 − y3). Thus, t1 > 0 if and only if the first disjunct, y2 > y1, holds;
and t2 > 0 if and only if the second disjunct, y2 > y3, holds. Finally, we add a neuron
z1 such that z1 = t1 + t2. It holds that z1 > 0 if and only if t1 > 0 ∨ t2 > 0. Thus, we
have reduced the complex property into an equivalent property in the desired form.
over-approximates ϕ1, we will make sure that for every x, N(x) ≤ N¯(x); and
thus, N¯(x) ≤ c =⇒ N(x) ≤ c. Because our output properties always have the
form N(x) > c, it is indeed the case that if ϕ2 is UNSAT, i.e. N¯(x) ≤ c for all x,
then N(x) ≤ c for all x and so ϕ1 is also UNSAT. We now propose a framework
for generating various N¯s with this property.
3.1 Abstraction
We seek to define an abstraction operator that removes a single neuron from the
network, by merging it with another neuron. To do this, we will first transform
N into an equivalent network, whose neurons have properties that will facilitate
their merging. Equivalent here means that for every input vector, both networks
produce the exact same output. First, each hidden neuron vi,j of our transformed
network will be classified as either a pos neuron or a neg neuron. A neuron is
pos if all the weights on its outgoing edges are positive, and is neg if all those
weights are negative. Second, orthogonally to the pos/neg classification, each
hidden neuron will also be classified as either an inc neuron or a dec neuron.
vi,j is an inc neuron of N if, when we look at N
[i] (where vi,j is an input neuron),
increasing the value of vi,j increases the value of the network’s output. Formally,
vi,j is inc if for every two input vectors x1 and x2 where x1[k] = x2[k] for k 6= j
and x1[j] > x2[j], it holds that N
[i](x1) > N
[i](x2). A dec neuron is defined
symmetrically, so that decreasing the value of x[j] increases the output. We first
describe this transformation (an illustration of which appears in Fig. 4), and
later we explain how it fits into our abstraction framework.
Our first step is to transform N into a new network,N ′, in which every hidden
neuron is classified as pos or neg. This transformation is done by replacing each
hidden neuron vij with two neurons, v
+
i,j and v
−
i,j , which are respectively pos
and neg. Both v+i,j an v
−
i,j retain a copy of all incoming edges of the original
vi,j ; however, v
+
i,j retains just the outgoing edges with positive weights, and v
−
i,j
retains just those with negative weights. Outgoing edges with negative weights
are removed from v+i,j by setting their weights to 0, and the same is done for
outgoing edges with positive weights for v−i,j . Formally, for every neuron vi−1,p,
w′(vi−1,p, v+i,j) = w(vi−1,p, vi,j), w
′(vi−1,p, v−i,j) = w(vi−1,p, vi,j)
where w′ represents the weights in the new network N ′. Also, for every neuron
vi+1,q
w′(v+i,j , vi+1,q) =
{
w(vi,j , vi+1,q) w(vi,j , vi+1,q) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
and
w′(v−i,j , vi+1,q) =
{
w(vi,j , vi+1,q) w(vi,j , vi+1,q) ≤ 0
0 otherwise
(see Fig. 4). This operation is performed once for every hidden neuron of N ,
resulting in a network N ′ that is roughly double the size of N . Observe that N ′
is indeed equivalent to N , i.e. their outputs are always identical.
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Fig. 4. Classifying neurons as pos/neg and inc/dec. In the initial network (left), the
neurons of the second hidden layer are already classified: + and − superscripts indicate
pos and neg neurons, respectively; the I superscript and green background indicate
inc, and the D superscript and red background indicate dec. Classifying node v1,1
is done by first splitting it into two nodes v+1,1 and v
−
1,1 (middle). Both nodes have
identical incoming edges, but the outgoing edges of v1,1 are partitioned between them,
according to the sign of each edge’s weight. In the last network (right), v+1,1 is split once
more, into an inc node with outgoing edges only to other inc nodes, and a dec node
with outgoing edges only to other dec nodes. Node v1,1 is thus transformed into three
nodes, each of which can finally be classified as inc or dec. Notice that in the worst
case, each node is split into four nodes, although for v1,1 three nodes were enough.
Our second step is to alter N ′ further, into a new network N ′′, where every
hidden neuron is either inc or dec (in addition to already being pos or neg).
Generating N ′′ from N ′ is performed by traversing the layers of N ′ backwards,
each time handling a single layer and possibly doubling its number of neurons:
– Initial step: the output layer has a single neuron, y. This neuron is an inc
node, because increasing its value will increase the network’s output value.
– Iterative step: observe layer i, and suppose the nodes of layer i + 1 have
already been partitioned into inc and dec nodes. Observe a neuron v+i,j in
layer i which is marked pos (the case for neg is symmetrical). We replace
v+i,j with two neurons v
+,I
i,j and v
+,D
i,j , which are inc and dec, respectively.
Both new neurons retain a copy of all incoming edges of v+i,j ; however, v
+,I
i,j
retains only outgoing edges that lead to inc nodes, and v+,Di,j retains only
outgoing edges that lead to dec nodes. Thus, for every vi−1,p and vi+1,q,
w′′(vi−1,p, v
+,I
i,j ) = w
′(vi−1,p, v+i,j), w
′′(vi−1,p, v
+,D
i,j ) = w
′(vi−1,p, v+i,j)
w′′(v+,Ii,j , vi+1,q) =
{
w′(v+i,j , vi+1,q) if vi+1,q is inc
0 otherwise
w′′(v+,Di,j , vi+1,q) =
{
w′(v+i,j , vi+1,q) if vi+1,q is dec
0 otherwise
where w′′ represents the weights in the new network N ′′. We perform this
step for each neuron in layer i, resulting in neurons that are each classified
as either inc or dec.
To understand the intuition behind this classification, recall that by our assump-
tion all hidden nodes use the ReLU activation function, which is monotonically
increasing. Because v+i,j is pos, all its outgoing edges have positive weights, and
so if its assignment was to increase (decrease), the assignments of all nodes to
which it is connected in the following layer would also increase (decrease). Thus,
we split v+i,j in two, and make sure one copy, v
+,I
i,j , is only connected to nodes that
need to increase (inc nodes), and that the other copy, v+,Di,j , is only connected
to nodes that need to decrease (dec nodes). This ensures that v+,Ii,j is itself inc,
and that v+,Di,j is dec. Also, both v
+,I
i,j and v
+,D
i,j remain pos nodes, because their
outgoing edges all have positive weights.
When this procedure terminates, N ′′ is equivalent to N ′, and so also to N ;
and N ′′ is roughly double the size of N ′, and roughly four times the size of
N . Both transformation steps are only performed for hidden neurons, whereas
the input and output neurons remain unchanged. This is summarized by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. Any DNN N can be transformed into an equivalent network N ′′
where each hidden neuron is pos or neg, and also inc or dec, by increasing its
number of neurons by a factor of at most 4.
Using Lemma 1, we can assume without loss of generality that the DNN
nodes in our input query ϕ1 are each marked as pos/neg and as inc/dec. We
are now ready to construct the over-approximation network N¯ . We do this by
specifying an abstract operator that merges a pair of neurons in the network
(thus reducing network size by one), and can be applied multiple times. The only
restrictions are that the two neurons being merged need to be from the same
hidden layer, and must share the same pos/neg and inc/dec attributes. Conse-
quently, applying abstract to saturation will result in a network with at most
4 neurons in each hidden layer, which over-approximates the original network.
This, of course, would be an immense reduction in the number of neurons for
most reasonable input networks.
The abstract operator’s behavior depends on the attributes of the neurons
being merged. For simplicity, we will focus on the 〈pos,inc〉 case. Let vi,j , vi,k
be two hidden neurons of layer i, both classified as 〈pos,inc〉. Because layer i
is hidden, we know that layers i+ 1 and i− 1 are defined. Let vi−1,p and vi+1,q
denote arbitrary neurons in the preceding and succeeding layer, respectively. We
construct a network N¯ that is identical to N , except that: (i) nodes vi,j and vi,k
are removed and replaced with a new single node, vi,t; and (ii) all edges that
touched nodes vi,j or vi,k are removed, and other edges are untouched. Finally,
we add new incoming and outgoing edges for the new node vi,t as follows:
– Incoming edges: w¯(vi−1,p, vi,t) = max{w(vi−1,p, vi,j), w(vi−1,p, vi,k)}
– Outgoing edges: w¯(vi,t, vi+1,q) = w(vi,j , vi+1,q) + w(vi,k, vi+1,q)
where w¯ represents the weights in the new network N¯ . An illustrative example
appears in Fig. 5. Intuitively, this definition of abstract seeks to ensure that
the new node vi,t always contributes more to the network’s output than the two
original nodes vi,j and vi,k — so that the new network produces a larger output
than the original for every input. By the way we defined the incoming edges of
the new neuron vi,t, we are guaranteed that for every input x passed into both
N and N¯ , the value assigned to vi,t in N¯ is greater than the values assigned to
both vi,j and vi,k in the original network. This works to our advantage, because
vi,j and vi,k were both inc — so increasing their values increases the output
value. By our definition of the outgoing edges, the values of any inc nodes in
layer i+ 1 increase in N¯ compared to N , and those of any dec nodes decrease.
By definition, this means that the network’s overall output increases.
The abstraction operation for the 〈neg,inc〉 case is identical to the one de-
scribed above. For the remaining two cases, i.e. 〈pos,dec〉 and 〈neg,dec〉, the
max operator in the definition is replaced with a min operator.
The next lemma (proof omitted due to lack of space) justifies the use of our
abstraction step, and can be applied once per each application of abstract:
Lemma 2. Let N¯ be derived from N by a single application of abstract. For
every x, it holds that N¯(x) ≥ N(x).
3.2 Refinement
The aforementioned abstract operator reduces network size by merging neu-
rons, but at the cost of accuracy: whereas for some input x0 the original network
returns N(x0) = 3, the over-approximation network N¯ created by abstract
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Fig. 5. Using abstract to merge 〈pos,inc〉 nodes. Initially (left), the three nodes v1, v2
and v3 are separate. Next (middle), abstract merges v1 and v2 into a single node. For
the edge between x1 and the new abstract node we pick the weight 4, which is the
maximal weight among edges from x1 to v1 and v2. Likewise, the edge between x2 and
the abstract node has weight −1. The outgoing edge from the abstract node to y has
weight 8, which is the sum of the weights of edges from v1 and v2 to y. Next, abstract
is applied again to merge v3 with the abstract node, and the weights are adjusted
accordingly (right). With every abstraction, the value of y (given as a formula at the
bottom of each DNN, where R represents the ReLU operator) increases. For example,
to see that 12R(4x1 − x2) ≥ 8R(4x1 − x2) + 4R(2x1 − 3x2), it is enough to see that
4R(4x1−x2) ≥ 4R(2x1−3x2), which holds because ReLU is a monotonically increasing
function and x1 and x2 are non-negative (being, themselves, the output of ReLU nodes).
might return N¯(x0) = 5. If our goal is prove that it is never the case that
N(x) > 10, this over-approximation may be adequate: we can prove that always
N¯(x) ≤ 10, and this will be enough. However, if our goal is to prove that it is
never the case that N(x) > 4, the over-approximation is inadequate: it is possi-
ble that the property holds for N , but because N¯(x0) = 5 > 4, our verification
procedure will return x0 as a spurious counterexample (a counterexample for
N¯ that is not a counterexample for N). In order to handle this situation, we
define a refinement operator, refine, that is the inverse of abstract: it trans-
forms N¯ into yet another over-approximation, N¯ ′, with the property that for
every x, N(x) ≤ N¯ ′(x) ≤ N¯(x). If N¯ ′(x0) = 3.5, it might be a suitable over-
approximation for showing that never N(x) > 4. In this section we define the
refine operator, and in Section 4 we explain how to use abstract and refine
as part of a CEGAR-based verification scheme.
Recall that abstract merges together a couple of neurons that share the
same attributes. After a series of applications of abstract, each hidden layer i
of the resulting network can be regarded as a partitioning of hidden layer i of the
original network, where each partition contains original, concrete neurons that
share the same attributes. In the abstract network, each partition is represented
by a single, abstract neuron. The weights on the incoming and outgoing edges of
this abstract neuron are determined according to the definition of the abstract
operator. For example, in the case of an abstract neuron v¯ that represents a set
of concrete neurons {v1, . . . , vn} all with attributes 〈pos,inc〉, the weight of each
incoming edge to v¯ is given by
w¯(u, v) = max(w(u, v1), . . . , w(u, vn))
where u represents a neuron that has not been abstracted yet, and w is the
weight function of the original network. The key point here is that the order of
abstract operations that merged v1, . . . , vn does not matter — but rather, only
the fact that they are now grouped together determines the abstract network’s
weights. The following corollary, which is a direct result of Lemma 2, establishes
this connection between sequences of abstract applications and partitions:
Corollary 1. Let N be a DNN where each hidden neuron is labeled as pos/neg
and inc/dec, and let P be a partitioning of the hidden neurons of N , that only
groups together hidden neurons from the same layer that share the same labels.
Then N and P give rise to an abstract neural network N¯ , which is obtained by
performing a series of abstract operations that group together neurons according
to the partitions of P. This N¯ is an over-approximation of N .
We now define a refine operation that is, in a sense, the inverse of abstract.
refine takes as input a DNN N¯ that was generated from N via a sequence of
abstract operations, and splits a neuron from N¯ in two. Formally, the operator
receives the original network N , the partitioning P, and a finer partition P ′ that
is obtained from P by splitting a single class in two. The operator then returns
a new abstract network, N¯ ′, that is the abstraction of N according to P ′.
Due to Corollary 1, and because N¯ returned by refine corresponds to a
partition P ′ of the hidden neurons of N , it is straightforward to show that N¯ is
indeed an over-approximation of N . The other useful property that we require
is the following:
Lemma 3. Let N¯ be an abstraction of N , and let N¯ ′ be a network obtained
from N¯ by applying a single refine step. Then for every input x it holds that
N¯(x) ≥ N¯ ′(x) ≥ N(x).
The second part of the inequality, N¯ ′(x) ≥ N(x) holds because N¯ ′ is an
over-approximation of N (Corollary 1). The first part of the inequality, N¯(x) ≥
N¯ ′(x), follows from the fact that N¯(x) can be obtained from N¯ ′(x) by a single
application of abstract.
In practice, in order to support the refinement of an abstract DNN, we main-
tain the current partitioning, i.e. the mapping from concrete neurons to the
abstract neurons that represent them. Then, when an abstract neuron is se-
lected for refinement (according to some heuristic, such as the one we propose
in Section 4), we adjust the mapping and use it to compute the weights of the
edges that touch the affected neuron.
4 A CEGAR-Based Approach
In Section 3 we defined the abstract operator that reduces network size at
the cost of reducing network accuracy, and its inverse refine operator that
increases network size and restores accuracy. Together with a black-box verifi-
cation procedure Verify that can dispatch queries of the form ϕ = 〈N,P,Q〉,
these components now allow us to design an abstraction-refinement algorithm
for DNN verification, given as Alg. 1 (we assume that all hidden neurons in the
input network have already been marked pos/neg and inc/dec).
Algorithm 1 Abstraction-based DNN Verification(N,P,Q)
1: Use abstract to generate an initial over-approximation N¯ of N
2: if Verify(N¯ , P,Q) is UNSAT then
3: return UNSAT
4: else
5: Extract counterexample c
6: if c is a counterexample for N then
7: return SAT
8: else
9: Use refine to refine N¯ into N¯ ′
10: N¯ ← N¯ ′
11: Goto step 2
12: end if
13: end if
Because N¯ is obtained via applications of abstract and refine, the sound-
ness of the underlying Verify procedure, together with Lemmas 2 and 3, guaran-
tees the soundness of Alg. 1. Further, the algorithm always terminates: this is the
case because all the abstract steps are performed first, followed by a sequence
of refine steps. Because no additional abstract operations are performed be-
yond Step 1, after finitely many refine steps N¯ will become identical to N , at
which point no spurious counterexample will be found, and the algorithm will
terminate with either SAT or UNSAT. Of course, termination is only guaranteed
when the underlying Verify procedure is guaranteed to terminate.
There are two steps in the algorithm that we intentionally left ambiguous:
Step 1, where the initial over-approximation is computed, and Step 9, where the
current abstraction is refined due to the discovery of a spurious counterexample.
The motivation was to make Alg. 1 general, and allow it to be customized by
plugging in different heuristics for performing Steps 1 and 9, which may depend
on the problem at hand. Below we propose a few such heuristics.
4.1 Generating an Initial Abstraction
The most na¨ıve way to generate the initial abstraction is to apply the abstract
operator to saturation. As previously discussed, abstract can merge together
any pair of hidden neurons from a given layer that share the same attributes.
Since there are four possible attribute combinations, this will result in each
hidden layer of the network having four neurons or fewer. This method, which
we refer to as abstraction to saturation, produces the smallest abstract networks
possible. The downside is that, in some case, these networks might be too coarse,
and might require multiple rounds of refinement before a SAT or UNSAT answer
can be reached.
A different heuristic for producing abstractions that may require fewer re-
finement steps is as follows. First, we select a finite set of input points, X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, all of which satisfy the input property P . These points can be gen-
erated randomly, or according to some coverage criterion of the input space. The
points of X are then used as indicators in estimating when the abstraction has
become too coarse: after every abstraction step, we check whether the property
still holds for x1, . . . , xn, and stop abstracting if this is not the case. The exact
technique, which we refer to as indicator-guided abstraction, appears in Alg. 2,
which is used to perform Step 1 of Alg. 1.
Algorithm 2 Indicator-Guided Abstraction(N,P,Q,X)
1: N¯ ← N
2: while ∀x ∈ X. N¯(x) satisfies Q and there are still neurons that can be merged do
3: ∆←∞, bestPair ← ⊥
4: for every pair of hidden neurons vi,j , vi,k with identical attributes do
5: m ← 0
6: for every node vi−1,p do
7: a ← w¯(vi−1,p, vi,j), b ← w¯(vi−1,p, vi,k)
8: if |a− b| > m then
9: m ← |a− b|
10: end if
11: end for
12: if m < ∆ then
13: ∆← m, bestPair ← 〈vi,j , vi,k〉
14: end if
15: end for
16: Use abstract to merge the nodes of bestPair, store the result in N¯
17: end while
18: return N¯
Another point that is addressed by Alg. 2, besides how many rounds of ab-
straction should be performed, is which pair of neurons should be merged in
every application of abstract. This, too, is determined heuristically. Since any
pair of neurons that we pick will result in the same reduction in network size, our
strategy is to prefer neurons that will result in a more accurate approximation.
Inaccuracies are caused by the max and min operators within the abstract
operator: e.g., in the case of max , every pair of incoming edges with weights
a, b are replaced by a single edge with weight max (a, b). Our strategy here is to
merge the pair of neurons for which the maximal value of |a− b| (over all incom-
ing edges with weights a and b) is minimal. Intuitively, this leads to max (a, b)
being close to both a and b — which, in turn, leads to an over-approximation
network that is smaller than the original, but is close to it weight-wise. We point
out that although repeatedly exploring all pairs (line 4) may appear costly, in
our experiments the time cost of this step was negligible compared to that of
the verification queries that followed. Still, if this step happens to become a bot-
tleneck, it is possible to adjust the algorithm to heuristically sample just some
of the pairs, and pick the best pair among those considered — without harming
the algorithm’s soundness.
As a small example, consider the network depicted on the left hand side
of Fig. 5. This network has three pairs of neurons that can be merged using
abstract (any subset of {v1, v2, v3}). Consider the pair v1, v2: the maximal value
of |a − b| for these neurons is max (|1 − 4)|, |(−2) − (−1)|) = 3. For pair v1, v3,
the maximal value is 1; and for pair v2, v3 the maximal value is 2. According to
the strategy described in Alg. 2, we would first choose to apply abstract on the
pair with the minimal maximal value, i.e. on the pair v1, v3.
4.2 Performing the Refinement Step
A refinement step is performed when a spurious counterexample x has been
found, indicating that the abstract network is too coarse. In other words, our
abstraction steps, and specifically the max and min operators that were used
to select edge weights for the abstract neurons, have resulted in the abstract
network’s output being too great for input x, and we now need to reduce it.
Thus, our refinement strategies are aimed at applying refine in a way that
will result in a significant reduction to the abstract network’s output. We note
that there may be multiple options for applying refine, on different nodes, such
that any of them would remove the spurious counterexample x from the abstract
network. In addition, it is not guaranteed that it is possible to remove x with
a single application of refine, and multiple consecutive applications may be
required.
One heuristic approach for refinement follows the well-studied notion of
counterexample-guided abstraction refinement [6]. Specifically, we leverage the
spurious counterexample x in order to identify a concrete neuron v, which is
currently mapped into an abstract neuron v¯, such that splitting v away from v¯
might rule out counterexample x. To do this, we evaluate the original network
on x and compute the value of v (we denote this value by v(x)), and then do
the same for v¯ in the abstract network (value denoted v¯(x)). Intuitively, a neu-
ron pair 〈v, v¯〉 for which the difference |v(x)− v¯(x)| is significant makes a good
candidate for a refinement operation that will split v away from v¯.
In addition to considering v(x) and v¯(x), we propose to also consider the
weights of the incoming edges of v and v¯. When these weights differ significantly,
this could indicate that v¯ is too coarse an approximation for v, and should be
refined. We argue that by combining these two criteria — edge weight difference
between v and v¯, which is a property of the current abstraction, together with
the difference between v(x) and v¯(x), which is a property of the specific input x,
we can identify abstract neurons that have contributed significantly to x being
a spurious counterexample.
The refinement heuristic is formally defined in Alg. 3. The algorithm traverses
the original neurons, looks for the edge weight times assignment value that has
changed the most as a result of the current abstraction, and then performs
refinement on the neuron at the end of that edge. As was the case with Alg. 2, if
considering all possible nodes turns out to be too costly, it is possible to adjust
the algorithm to explore only some of the nodes, and pick the best one among
those considered — without jeopardizing the algorithm’s soundness.
Algorithm 3 Counterexample-Guided Refinement(N, N¯, x)
1: bestNeuron ← ⊥, m← 0
2: for each concrete neuron vi,j of N mapped into abstract neuron v¯i,j′ of N¯ do
3: for each concrete neuron vi−1,k of N mapped into abstract neuron v¯i−1,k′ of N¯
do
4: if |w(vi−1,k, vi,j)− w¯(v¯i−1,k′ , v¯i,j′)| · |vi,j(x)− v¯i,j′(x)| > m then
5: m← |w(vi−1,k, vi,j)− w¯(v¯i−1,k′ , v¯i,j′)| · |vi,j(x)− v¯i,j′(x)|
6: bestNeuron ← vi,j
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: Use refine to split bestNeuron from its abstract neuron
As an example, let us use Alg. 3 to choose a refinement step for the right hand
side network of Fig. 5, for a spurious counterexample 〈x1, x2〉 = 〈1, 0〉. For this
input, the original neurons’ evaluation is v1 = 1, v2 = 4 and v3 = 2, whereas the
abstract neuron that represents them evaluates to 4. Suppose v1 is considered
first. In the abstract network, w¯(x1, v¯1) = 4 and w¯(x2, v¯1) = −1; whereas in the
original network, w(x1, v1) = 1 and w(x2, v1) = −2. Thus, the largest value m
computed for v1 is |w(x1, v1) − w¯(x1, v¯1)| · |4 − 1| = 3 · 3 = 9. This value of m
is larger than the one computed for v2 (0) and for v3 (4), and so v1 is selected
for the refinement step. After this step is performed, v2 and v3 are still mapped
to a single abstract neuron, whereas v1 is mapped to a separate neuron in the
abstract network.
5 Implementation and Evaluation
Our implementation of the abstraction-refinement framework includes modules
that read a DNN in the NNet format [19] and a property to be verified, create
an initial abstract DNN as described in Section 4, invoke a black-box verification
engine, and perform refinement as described in Section 4. The process terminates
when the underlying engine returns either UNSAT, or an assignment that is a
true counterexample for the original network. For experimentation purposes, we
integrated our framework with the Marabou DNN verification engine [22]. Our
implementation and benchmarks are publicly available online [9].
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Fig. 6. (From [20]) An illustration of the
sensor readings passed as input to the
ACAS Xu DNNs.
Our experiments included verify-
ing several properties of the 45 ACAS
Xu DNNs for airborne collision avoid-
ance [19,20]. ACAS Xu is a system de-
signed to produce horizontal turning ad-
visories for an unmanned aircraft (the
ownship), with the purpose of prevent-
ing a collision with another nearby air-
craft (the intruder). The ACAS Xu sys-
tem receive as input sensor readings, in-
dicating the location of the intruder rel-
ative to the ownship, the speeds of the
two aircraft, and their directions (see
Fig. 6). Based on these readings, it selects one of 45 DNNs, to which the read-
ings are then passed as input. The selected DNN then assigns scores to five
output neurons, each representing a possible turning advisory: strong left, weak
left, strong right, weak right, or clear-of-conflict (the latter indicating that it is
safe to continue along the current trajectory). The neuron with the lowest score
represents the selected advisory. We verified several properties of these DNNs
based on the list of properties that appeared in [20] — specifically focusing on
properties that ensure that the DNNs always advise clear-of-conflict for distant
intruders, and that they are robust to (i.e., do not change their advisories in the
presence of) small input perturbations.
Each of the ACAS Xu DNNs has 300 hidden nodes spread across 6 hidden
layers, leading to 1200 neurons when the transformation from Section 3.1 is
applied. In our experiments we set out to check whether the abstraction-based
approach could indeed prove properties of the ACAS Xu networks on abstract
networks that had significantly fewer neurons than the original ones. In addition,
we wished to compare the proposed approaches for generating initial abstractions
(the abstraction to saturation approach versus the indicator-guided abstraction
described in Alg. 2), in order to identify an optimal configuration for our tool.
Finally, once the optimal configuration has been identified, we used it to compare
our tool’s performance to that of vanilla Marabou. The results are described next.
Fig. 7 depicts a comparison of the two approaches for generating initial ab-
stractions: the abstraction to saturation scheme (x axis), and the indicator-
guided abstraction scheme described in Alg. 2 (y axis). Each experiment in-
cluded running our tool twice on the same benchmark (network and property),
with an identical configuration except for the initial abstraction being used. The
plot depicts the total time (log-scale, in seconds, with a 20-hour timeout) spent
by Marabou solving verification queries as part of the abstraction-refinement
procedure. It shows that, in contrast to our intuition, abstraction to saturation
almost always outperforms the indicator-guided approach. This is perhaps due
to the fact that, although it might entail additional rounds of refinement, the ab-
straction to saturation approach tends to produce coarse verification queries that
are easily solved by Marabou, resulting in an overall improved performance. We
thus conclude that, at least in the ACAS Xu case, the abstraction to saturation
approach is superior to that of indicator-guided abstraction.
This experiment also confirms that properties can indeed be proved on ab-
stract networks that are significantly smaller than the original — i.e., despite
the initial 4x increase in network size due to the preprocessing phase, the final
abstract network on which our abstraction-enhanced approach could solve the
query was usually substantially smaller than the original network. Specifically,
among the abstraction to saturation experiments that terminated, the final net-
work on which the property was shown to be SAT or UNSAT had an average size
of 268.8 nodes, compared to the original 310 — a 13% reduction. Because DNN
verification becomes exponentially more difficult as the network size increases,
this reduction is highly beneficial.
Fig. 7. Generating initial abstractions using abstraction to saturation and indicator-
guided abstraction.
Next, we compared our abstraction-enhanced Marabou (in abstraction to
saturation mode) to the vanilla version. The plot in Fig. 8 compares the total
query solving time of vanilla Marabou (y axis) to that of our approach (x axis).
We ran the tools on 90 ACAS Xu benchmarks (2 properties, checked on each
of the 45 networks), with a 20-hour timeout. We observe that the abstraction-
enhanced version significantly outperforms vanilla Marabou on average — often
solving queries orders-of-magnitude more quickly, and timing out on fewer bench-
marks. Specifically, the abstraction-enhanced version solved 58 instances, versus
35 solved by Marabou. Further, over the instances solved by both tools, the
abstraction-enhanced version had a total query median runtime of 1045 seconds,
versus 63671 seconds for Marabou. Interestingly, the average size of the abstract
networks for which our tool was able to solve the query was 385 nodes — which
is an increase compared to the original 310 nodes. However, the improved run-
times demonstrate that although these networks were slightly larger, they were
still much easier to verify, presumably because many of the network’s original
neurons remained abstracted away.
Fig. 8. Comparing the run time (in seconds, logscale) of vanilla Marabou and the
abstraction-enhanced version on the ACAS Xu benchmarks.
Finally, we used our abstraction-enhanced Marabou to verify adversarial ro-
bustness properties [35]. Intuitively, an adversarial robustness property states
that slight input perturbations cannot cause sudden spikes in the network’s out-
put. This is desirable because such sudden spikes can lead to misclassification of
inputs. Unlike the ACAS Xu domain-specific properties [20], whose formulation
required input from human experts, adversarial robustness is a universal prop-
erty, desirable for every DNN. Consequently it is easier to formulate, and has
received much attention (e.g., [2,10,20,36]).
In order to formulate adversarial robustness properties for the ACAS Xu
networks, we randomly sampled the ACAS Xu DNNs to identify input points
where the selected output advisory, indicated by an output neuron yi, received
a much lower score than the second-best advisory, yj (recall that the advisory
with the lowest score is selected). For such an input point x0, we then posed the
verification query: does there exist a point x that is close to x0, but for which yj
receives a lower score than yi? Or, more formally: (‖x− x0‖L∞ ≤ δ)∧ (yj ≤ yi).
If this query is SAT then there exists an input x whose distance to x0 is at most
δ, but for which the network assigns a better (lower) score to advisory yj than
to yi. However, if this query is UNSAT, no such point x exists. Because we select
point x0 such that yi is initially much smaller than yj , we expect the query to
be UNSAT for small values of δ.
For each of the 45 ACAS Xu networks, we created robustness queries for 20
distinct input points — producing a total of 900 verification queries (we arbi-
trarily set δ = 0.1). For each of these queries we compared the runtime of vanilla
Marabou to that of our abstraction-enhanced version (with a 20-hour timeout).
The results are depicted in Fig. 9. Vanilla Marabou was able to solve more in-
stances — 893 out of 900, versus 805 that the abstraction-enhanced version was
able to solve. However, on the vast majority of the remaining experiments, the
abstraction-enhanced version was significantly faster, with a total query median
runtime of only 0.026 seconds versus 15.07 seconds in the vanilla version (over
the 805 benchmarks solved by both tools). This impressive 99% improvement
in performance highlights the usefulness of our approach also in the context
of adversarial robustness. In addition, over the solved benchmarks, the average
size of the abstract networks for which our tool was able to solve the query was
104.4 nodes, versus 310 nodes in each of the original networks — a 66% reduc-
tion in size. This reinforces our statement that, in many cases, DNNs contain a
great deal of unneeded neurons, which can safely be removed by the abstraction
process for the purpose of verification.
Fig. 9. Comparing the run time (seconds, logscale) of vanilla Marabou and the
abstraction-enhanced version on the ACAS Xu adversarial robustness properties.
6 Related Work
In recent years, multiple schemes have been proposed for the verification of neu-
ral networks. These include SMT-based approaches, such as Marabou [22,23],
Reluplex [20], DLV [17] and others; approaches based on formulating the prob-
lem as a mixed integer linear programming instance (e.g., [4,7,8,36]); approaches
that use sophisticated symbolic interval propagation [37], or abstract interpre-
tation [10]; and others (e.g., [1,18,25,27,30,38,39]). These approaches have been
applied in a variety of tasks, such as measuring adversarial robustness [2,17],
neural network simplification [11], neural network modification [12], and many
others (e.g., [23,34]). Our approach can be integrated with any sound and com-
plete solver as its engine, and then applied towards any of the aforementioned
tasks. Incomplete solvers could also be used and might afford better performance,
but this could result in our approach also becoming incomplete.
Some existing DNN verification techniques incorporate abstraction elements.
In [31], the authors use abstraction to over-approximate the Sigmoid activation
function with a collection of rectangles. If the abstract verification query they
produce is UNSAT, then so is the original. When a spurious counterexample is
found, an arbitrary refinement step is performed. The authors report limited
scalability, tackling only networks with a few dozen neurons. Abstraction tech-
niques also appear in the AI2 approach [10], but there it is the input property
and reachable regions that are over-approximated, as opposed to the DNN it-
self. Combining this kind of input-focused abstraction with our network-focused
abstraction is an interesting avenue for future work.
7 Conclusion
With deep neural networks becoming widespread and with their forthcoming
integration into safety-critical systems, there is an urgent need for scalable tech-
niques to verify and reason about them. However, the size of these networks
poses a serious challenge. Abstraction-based techniques can mitigate this diffi-
culty, by replacing networks with smaller versions thereof to be verified, without
compromising the soundness of the verification procedure. The abstraction-based
approach we have proposed here can provide a significant reduction in network
size, thus boosting the performance of existing verification technology.
In the future, we plan to continue this work along several axes. First, we
intend to investigate refinement heuristics that can split an abstract neuron
into two arbitrary sized neurons. In addition, we will investigate abstraction
schemes for networks that use additional activation functions, beyond ReLUs.
Finally, we plan to make our abstraction scheme parallelizable, allowing users to
use multiple worker nodes to explore different combinations of abstraction and
refinement steps, hopefully leading to faster convergence.
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